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| Keywords: BR, Vietnam, 1972, Easter Counter-Offensive, file 029.jpg en http //www marines mil/Portals/59/Publications/U S 20Marines 20in 20Vietnam 20The 20war 20that 20would 20not 20end 201971-1973 20PCN 2019000311200_1 pdf At the beginning Admiral John S McCain Jr CinCPac cancelled Exercise Golden Dragon on 3 April and III MAF's commander Lieutenant General Loluis Metzger ordered General Miller and the 9th MAB staff to remain on the USS Blue Ridge for combat or evacuation operations Latter it was learned that General Cao Van Vien of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff and General Abrams had not sent or approved the initial calls for assistance to the Seventh Fleet the forward deployment of amphibious forces to holding areas off the DMZ Seventh Fleet was saturated with message traffic at this point The 9th MAB had various contingency plans the amphibious brigade turned its attention from potentially conducting emergency evacuations to building up its forces some of the functions performed by the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade during the period normally are not assigned to the landing force; The Marine Corps position is that landing force assets will not be assigned to perform these functions except in an emergency the uncertainty of the military situation in MR I made the evacuation of Americans from the region the most probable mission After his reconnaissance defenses ashore were virtually nonexistent and that a successful evacuation under enemy attack was doubtful 23 Dreaming American planners had long considered the possi-bility of an amphibious landing at Vinh to cut the Vietnamese panhandle north of the DMZ The Marine Corps Schools Quantico Virginia had present-ed such a landing as a planning exercise to students in the past suggesting this option to General William C Westmoreland in 1965 while Jones was a brigadier general Seventh Fleet conducted feints north of the DMZ in 1968 and 1971 The availability of the U S forces and the vulnerabilities of the North Vietnamese to this course of action were never greater than in the spring of 1972 A Central Intelligence Agency analyst on Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker's staff in Saigon Edwin W Besch observed that an amphibious landing in North Vietnam to rear of NVA forces would have had a greater operational effect than the tactical landings conducted in South Vietnam Early on Seventh Fleet's Admiral Mack proposed an amphibious assault directly at the North Vietnamese mainland or at least a feint or demonstration arriving in the Tonkin Gulf Admiral Gaddis issued an order for a Task Force 76 demonstration against the Dong Hoi-Quang Khe areas Admiral McCain CinCPac them directed a demonstration just south of the DMZ General Kroesen objected both operations were canceled prior to a proposed D-Day of 24 April 1972 By late April planning Prompted by the need to relieve pressure on South Vietnamese forces in MR 1 to land Marines by surface and air assault on several points in North Vietnam there was scarcely a single square-inch of the North Vietnamese coastal littoral of any value whatsoever which was not the subject of at least one plan Courses of action included Dong Hoi Quang Khe Hon Mat Vinh 24 Dreaming and politics Admiral Mack again moved north Operation Heroic Action a raid to seize the Dong Hoi ferry crossings south of Vinh General Miller said the purpose was to go into North Vietnam and a whole bunch of other things communication exercises began on 11 May off Dong Hoi On 13 May Admiral thomas H Moorer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff postponed the operation indefinitely Admiral McCain CinCPac then ordered a demonstration for the next day A 9th MAB message to General Metzger described Heroic Action as a turnaway landing General Jones then FMFPac remembered the raid as a fact Records from Seventh Fleet and Fleet Marine Force Pacific indicated it was to be a raid while records from the Pacific Command and JCS stated for political reasons it was never more than a deception plan The plan for an amphibious assault on Haiphong in early May the port for Hanoi was rejected in D C with a vigorous No After which a very senior member of staff leaves the IOIC briefing room clutching his butt and exclaiming this is why the Navy has REAR admirals General Miller observed that political constraints precluded the reintroduction of U S Marine Corps troops into South Vietnam in a land warfare role Seventh Fleet amphibious forces were now totally com-mitted to the support of American and Vietnamese units in South Vietnam 25 https //en wikipedia org/w/index php title USS_Blue_Ridge_ LCC-19 oldid 611915045 2013-12-03 22 56 57 http //www marines mil/Portals/59/Publications/U S 20Marines 20in 20Vietnam 20The 20war 20that 20would 20not 20end 201971-1973 20PCN 2019000311200_1 pdf U S MARINES IN VIETNAM THE WAR THAT WOULD NOT END 1971-1973 PD-USGov USS Blue Ridge LCC-19 Uploaded with UploadWizard | ||||
